The literature so far has analyzed the effects of minimum quality standards (MQS) in oligopoly, using models of pure vertical differentiation, with only two firms, and perfect information. We consider products that are differentiated horizontally and vertically, with imperfect consumers' information, and more than two firms. We show that a MQS changes the consumers' perception of produced qualities. This increases the firms' returns from quality enhancing investments, notwithstanding contrary strategic effects. Our analysis justifies the use of MQS in industries where consumers cannot precisely ascertain the quality of goods, for instance pharmaceuticals or products with chemical components involved.
Introduction
The quality of goods is at the center of a lively policy debate. In Europe, quality certification and quality standards have become a matter of increasing concern for firms and policy makers over the years, along with the completion of the common market and the implementation of uniform trading rules. In many industries-ranging from passenger transport, to food, chemicals, children toys-quality and safety regulation are also intertwined and almost indistinguishable. Policy intervention is often justified by the claim that consumers have to make their purchases without the knowledge necessary to assess the quality of goods. In relevant cases, like for chemical substances, qualities are difficult to ascertain even by research labs equipped with the necessary tools, as shown by the debate leading to the REACH regulation by the European Commission. 1 To capture some of these features, the present paper deals with mandatory minimum quality standards (MQS) and studies their effects on product qualities and on welfare in an oligopolistic industry where buyers have imperfect information about the quality of goods.
Unlike the present paper, the existing literature on MQS is largely and almost uniquely based upon models of oligopolistic competition with pure vertical product differentiation. These models, derived from the seminal paper by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) , share some well-known typical features. First, the firms' products differ only in one aspect, the vertical quality dimension, which is observable and which, if increased, leads to higher utility for each consumer. Second, in a duopoly, the rival firms try to differentiate their products, in order to relax price competition (Shaked and Sutton 1982) . This implies that one of the two producers assigns to its product a low level of quality, even in the case where quality can be increased at no cost for the producer. Third, once a MQS is introduced at a level that lies between the low and the high unregulated quality levels, the hedonic prices of goods decrease, while the high quality firm's, as well as the aggregate profits, fall (Ronnen 1991). The reason is that, since the quality standard reduces the distance between the quality levels of the two firms, it leads to more intense price competition, with lower prices per unit of quality offered. This, by the way, also explains why aggregate profits fall. In this vein of the literature, other papers (Crampes and Hollander 1995; Ecchia and Lambertini 1997; Maxwell 1998; Valletti 2000; Jinji and Toshimitsu 2004) , explore the issues of consumers' and firms' gains and losses, and of quality changes, always based on models of pure vertical differentiation.
Another noteworthy common trait of the literature on MQS is that perfect information is generally assumed. This is at odds with the very beginning of explanations of MQS-like practices (Leland 1979) , where, absent strategic interplays between producers, these are interpreted as corrections to a "lemon" phenomenon. In a way, a MQS in Leland (1979) has the effect of cutting away the lowest tail of a distribution of qualities, thereby increasing the average marketed quality in a competitive setting. Roughly speaking, the present paper is closer than the existing ones to this interpretation of MQS. With respect to Leland, the difference is that the increase in the
